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Chapter Eight 
A Moralist in an Age of Scientific 
Analysis and Skepticism 
Habit in the Life and Work of William James 
David E. Leary 
In June 1874, a thirty-two-year-old sometime instructor of anatomy and 
physiology at Harvard College ruminated on the situation faced by the novel-
ist George Eliot, especially as regarded her recent novel, A1iddlemarch 
(1871-1872), which he had previously described as "fuller of human stuff 
than any novel that was ever written." 1 "She seems to me to be primarily a 
moralist," he wrote, though "she writes in an age of scientific analysis and 
skepticism, and her own lot has been cast in a circle whose way of feeling 
and thinking is paiiicularly adverse to anything like moral unction or enthu-
siasm." As a result, he continued, she "never gets her imagination fairly 
warmed and going without proceeding to reflect upon it herself and make a 
critical, often ironical, commentary as it runs." Thus, "the mass of her mental 
energy never pulls together," and the inner tension within her work leaves the 
reader "with an annoying uncertainty as to her purpose." Ah, but "what she 
might have done in an age of belief, when the best thought around her was 
constructive and enthusiastic and strengthened her native feelings instead of 
throwing cold water on them"! Had that been her lot, she would have been 
"twice as great as she is now." 2 
Thus wrote William James (1842-1910) in words he might have used to 
describe his own situation. For if Eliot was "married to [George] Lewes, 
hand in glove with [Thomas} Huxley, [Herbert} Spencer and a host of peo-
ple" of that sort, as James said, 3 he himself was deeply engaged in reading 
the works of those same individuals and was thoroughly immersed in the 
same atmosphere, as represented and promulgated by his O\Vn older friend 
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Chauncey Wright, a similarly and in fact even more aggressively and reduc-
tively minded empiricist. 
Just two years before he offered this assessment of George Eliot, James 
wrote a draft of what he hoped to be his first publication in psychology, a 
manuscript now labeled a "Draft on Brain Processes and Feelings" (1872). In 
that draft, as he told a colleague seventeen years later, he "excogitated" a 
"conscious automaton theory" that depicted human thought and action as 
produced automatically and entirely by brain processes that cause feelings of 
effort and decision along with thought and action. Though we might feel that 
our will had something to do with our thought or action, in fact (James had 
written) that feeling was determined mechanically, just as the thought and 
action were. James never published this draft, and soon ceased to advance its 
central argument, having come to realize "grounds to doubt it." 4 And seven 
years later, in an article entitled "Are We Automata?" (1879), he explained 
why he had become so adamantly opposed to that theory. 
In this chapter I will review how James got from his earlier position, 
which so readily fit the scientific and skeptical tenor of his age, to his later 
position, and I will indicate how the views he began to articulate by the mid-
1870s became central to the doctrines he presented in his magisterial Princi-
ples of Psychology (1890) and in his subsequent work in psychology and 
philosophy. Along the way I will make it clear that even before 1872, when 
he was attending lectures and doing physiological research in Harvard's 
Medical School, James was a deeply engaged advocate of philosophy, which 
he was determined to advance through a thorough yet critical understanding 
of the biological foundations of human thought, feeling, and action. He 
viewed this scientifically oriented yet analytical approach to philosophy as a 
means of clarifying not just what is the case in human life, but also what 
should be life's outcome. Morality, in short, was always interpolated in his 
thinking, teaching, researching, and writing. Although he took a biological 
view of cognition, and embedded it within a Darwinian selectionist frame-
work (which he extended "all the way up" from the level of sensation 
through perception to cognition and beyond), his "naturalist approach" was 
not meant to eliminate consideration of "struggling with temptation" or the 
identification of the sources and targets of"true moral energy," as he put it in 
"Are We Automata?"5 Quite the contrary! 
1. YEARNING FOR ORDER, ACHIEVEMENT, AND SELF-
ASSERTION 
Habit, I plan to show, was the key to James's solution of the dilemma that he 
faced as he weighed the intellectual attractiveness of an entirely materialistic 
and causal explanation of human existence (a mode of explanation accepted 
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by many in his scientific and skeptical age) against the equally compellingly 
moral imperative to believe that he could and should live a responsible and 
meaningful life (a life in which real decisions were made about actually 
possible alternative courses of action). James's interest in the nature and 
utility of habit reached back into the 1860s. It first appeared as a function of 
personal rather than professional concerns, initially revolving around his 
sensitivity to the possibly ameliorative effects that habits might bring into his 
life. For well before the beginning of his career, James sought greater direc-
tion and regularity in what he had come to experience as a somewhat random 
and purposeless life. 
As already amply documented, James was the son of a wealthy and 
quirky father, whose whims assured that James spent much of his childhood 
and youth moving from place to place, from this to that side of the Atlantic, 
shifting tutors and schools, studying in one language and then another, while 
focusing now on science, now on art, now on something else, depending on 
whatever suited the present time, place, inclination, or available instruction. 6 
And beyond the lack of sequential learning and personal stability that re-
sulted from this fickle regimen, James was, by temperament, more than a 
little variable in his own inclinations. As his sister Alice famously put it, he 
was "just like a blob of mercury." It was impossible to "put a mental finger 
upon him." 7 Similarly, his brother Henry recalled that in their early years 
James "was always round the corner and out of sight." 8 And later in life, 
James exhibited "an extremely impatient temperament," as he himself admit-
ted, adding that "I am a motor, need change, and get very quickly bored."9 
Countering this tendency, James believed from early on-as early as 
1858, at the tender age of sixteen-that it "ought to be everyone's object in 
life" to be "as much use as possible" in the grand scheme of things, not only 
because it is the "duty" of every person to be of "use," but also because no 
one, and certainly not himself, "would wish to go through life without leav-
ing a trace." This personal concern about humans leaving a trace, not as 
passively mechanical objects but as actively choosing subjects who contrib-
ute "something which without us could not be," was so persistently important 
to James that he reported nine years later, in 1868, that the only thing keeping 
him from giving up and committing suicide during those "skeptical intervals" 
when "the waves of doubt are weltering" was the "feeling that by waiting and 
living by hook or crook long enough l might make my nick, however small a 
one" and thus "assert my reali(r." For James, only by asserting his personal 
reality, which he associated with "the thought of my having a will," could he 
alleviate the depressive effects of contemplating the kind of determinism 
typically associated with scientific understanding and analysis. 10 
Habit figured in two ways during and after these crucial years of James' s 
personal development. In contrast to the "hundred side-tendencies, ambi-
tions, interests" that pulled him this way and that, he came to realize that he 
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had to choose "a few tolerable simple peaceable desires" and then pursue 
them with "simple patient monotonous" regularity. He felt that this alone-
leading a life of more habitual behavior-would put him "on the path to 
accomplishing something some day." (His behavior had been so erratic, he 
said, that "I feel as if the greater part of the past 10 years had [been] worse 
than wasted.") And in addition to reforming his behavior, he determined that 
he had to cultivate "habits of attention and order in thinking," including 
attending to the thought of"my having a will," which alone could provide the 
"moral support" he so desperately needed. 11 
Such resolutions dot James's diary entries and letters from the 1860s into 
the 1870s, as do indications of the many starts and stops that characterized 
his tortured, by no means linear progress toward personal maturity, mental 
health, and professional achievement. Making matters more difficult, his 
resolve was complicated by his decision not only to commit himself to scien-
tific endeavors but also to persevere in his ruminations upon the philosophi-
cal implications of those endeavors. Consistent with his strenuous approach 
to other issues, James chose not to take the easier route away from science, 
by which he could have escaped a key source of his anxiety and depression. 
Instead he took what he considered to be the more honest and manly ap-
proach, 12 embracing his attraction to science as well as his concern for mo-
rality, thus assuring continued conflict between the specter of scientific de-
terminism and his yearning for moral efficacy. It all came to a head, though 
not a final conclusion, in an often cited crisis that began in early February 
and culminated in late April 1870. 
On February 1, 1870, James recorded in his diary that he had "about 
touched bottom" and had to "face the choice with open eyes," whether to 
"throw the moral business overboard" or to "follow it, and it alone." Saying 
that he would "give the latter alternative a fair trial," he admitted that "hither-
to I have tried to fire myself with the moral interest, as an aid in the accom-
plishing of certain utilitarian ends of attaining certain difficult but salutary 
habits," but "in all this I was cultivating the moral int [i.e., interest] only as a 
means, & more or less humbugging myself." Now, he wrote, "I must regard 
these useful ends only as occasions for my moral life to become active." 
Whatever the immediate result of this conviction, James's next diary entry is 
a drawing of a tombstone, commemorating the death of his beloved cousin 
Minny Temple on March 9. The entry after that, on March 22, is addressed to 
Minny and includes the comment: "Minny, your death makes me feel the 
nothingness of all our egotistic fury." One can only imagine what was going 
through James's mind at the time, but on April 30 he reported that 
I think yesterday was a crisis in my life. I finished the first part of [Charles] 
Renouvier's 2nd Essays and saw no reason why his definition of free will-the 
sustaining of a thought because I choose to when I might have other 
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thoughts-need be the definition of an illusion. At any rate I will assume for 
the present-until next year-that it is no illusion. My first act of free will 
shall be to believe in free will. 
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James ended the paragraph noting that if he was better by the coming Janu-
ary, he might "perhaps return to metaphysic study & skepticism without 
danger to my powers of action." But in the meantime, he wrote, he needed to 
"recollect that only when habits of order are formed can we advance to really 
interesting fields of action" and that "one link dropped" from the interlocking 
chain of habit "undoes an indefinite number." And further on in the same 
diary entry, he remarked that 
Hitherto, when I have felt like taking a free initiative ... suicide seemed the 
most manly form to put my daring into; now, I will go a step further ,,·ith my 
will, [and] not only act with it, but believe as \\ell; believe in my individual 
reality, and creative po\ver. 
Henceforth, he declared, he would put his faith in "the self governing resis-
tance of the ego to the world." 13 Whatever he wrote next has been torn from 
his diary. 
2. PREPARING FOR A CAREER IN PSYCHOLOGY AND 
PHILOSOPHY 
The fact that James articulated a "conscious automaton theory" in his "Draft 
on Brain Processes and Feelings" ( 1872) written just two years after his 
famous declaration of free will, suggests the jagged path he still had to 
traverse, sometimes turning toward and sometimes away from a completely 
deterministic account of human behavior. In any case, James's next diary 
entry-the next one not ripped from his diary-is dated February I 0, I 873, 
and it records his decision "to stick to biology for a profession in case I am 
not called to a chair of philosophy." Despite this prospect, James wrote that 
he would nevertheless continue to regard philosophy as his "vocation" and 
would "never let slip a chance to do a stroke at it." 14 Then, on April 10, 
James reported in his diary that he had told Charles Eliot, his former chemis-
try teacher and the current and subsequently long-serving president of Har-
vard, that he would "accept the anatomical instruction [i.e., instructorship] 
for next year, if well enough to perform it." 15 At the time, James was already 
engaged in teaching a semester-length course in comparative anatomy and 
physiology at Eliot's prior request. Thus James had begun to move from 
attending lectures, doing laboratory research, and engaging in a wide range 
of reading, to his first gainful employment, which led in turn to his appoint-
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ment as acting director of Harvard's Museum of Comparative Anatomy (in 
1874) and then as assistant professor of physiology (in 1876). 
In the six years between his appointment to the Museum and 1880, in 
addition to teaching comparative anatomy and physiology, James offered the 
first course-a graduate course-in the new physiological psychology (in 
1875), established and had his students use the first laboratory of experimen-
tal psychology in the United States (also in 1875), began teaching undergrad-
uate and graduate courses in psychology under the auspices of the Philoso-
phy Department (in 1877), delivered the Johns Hopkins University Lectures 
in Baltimore on "The Senses and the Brain and Their Relations to Thought" 
(1878), delivered the Lowell Institute Lectures in Boston on "The Brain and 
the Mind" (1878), directed the first Ph.D. in psychology-through the De-
partment of Philosophy-at Harvard (in 1878), and finally received his cov-
eted appointment as assistant professor of philosophy (in 1880). By then he 
had signed a contract (in 1878) to produce his Principles of Psychology and 
published his first substantive articles in psychology and philosophy (in 1878 
and 1879). Thus he was well on his way to becoming the person who is now 
known as a founder of both scientific psychology and pragmatic philosophy. 
To understand James's development and then rejection of "conscious 
automaton theory," and to situate his distinctive treatment of habit within its 
contemporary scientific context, we need to look back from his subsequent 
fame to the early 1860s, when he enrolled as a student at Harvard's Lawrence 
Scientific School. Having just given up his study of art in Newport, Rhode 
Island, James came to Cambridge to fulfill an earlier interest in natural histo-
ry 16 under the guidance of such distinguished scientists as the zoologist and 
geologist Louis Agassiz, the botanist and taxonomist Asa Gray, and the 
anatomist Jeffries Wyman. All three, in varying ways, were intimately con-
nected to significant ongoing scientific developments-the first two (Agassiz 
and Gray) having particularly close, though quite different relations to 
Charles Darwin, whose revolutionary On the Origin of Species ( 1859) was 
then just two years old. In addition, James came into contact with Charles 
Sanders Peirce, another student at the Scientific School, who would become 
one of his most treasured intellectual interlocutors. 17 Thus, when James 
turned toward the study of medicine in 1864, and returned to it after a year-
long research trip to Brazil with Agassiz (in 1865-1866), he already had a 
solid grounding in science. And while in the Medical School, working to-
wards his 1869 M.D. degree, he continued to explore anatomy with Wyman 
even as he studied medicine with Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr. In addition, 
during a break from his medical studies (in 1867), he spent time in Europe (in 
Berlin in particular), where he attended courses and lectures on physiology 
and was especially impressed by the eminent physiologist Emil Du Bois-
Reymond's research on electrical charges accompanying muscle action, a 
topic that would be relevant to James's later understanding of habit. It was 
J, 
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during this same stay in Europe that he became familiar with the experimen-
tal research of Hermann von Helmholtz and Wilhelm Wundt, and concluded 
that "perhaps the time has come for Psychology to begin to be a science." 18 
From that time on, his interest in "mental science" solidified and became 
more prominent in his thinking.19 
All in all, the 1860s were a heady time for James, even given his well-
known bouts of ill health, and he absorbed all that he could from class, 
reading, laboratory, and conversation. Throughout the decade, as he pursued 
coursework in chemistry, natural history, anatomy and physiology, he also 
followed the most recent developments in the scientific study of force, ener-
gy, and matter, and he supplemented his scientific studies by reading broadly 
in psychiatry, philosophy, and literature. Besides Peirce, his friends toward 
the end of the decade included James Jackson Putnam, later a leading neurol-
ogist; Henry Bowditch, a future pioneering physiologist in whose laboratory 
he would continue his own research into the 1870s; and Chauncey Wright, a 
philosopher with broad and lively interests, whom Darwin would invite to 
address "when a thing may properly be said to be effected by the will of 
man." 20 The result of Darwin's invitation to Wright was an important article 
on the "Evolution of Self-Consciousness" ( 1873). At the same time, in the 
early 1870s, Wright was active in the Cambridge Metaphysical Club in 
which participants (including James and Peirce) addressed many of the press-
ing philosophical issues of the time, especially in relation to the import of 
scientific theory and practice. 21 And in the same period James initiated corre-
spondence with Charles Renouvier and then, in mid-decade, participated in a 
second philosophical discussion group that focused primarily on Hegel. 
Though James started his formal course of scientific and medical study 
from a less advanced position than students like Peirce, he quickly demon-
strated sufficient ability and insight to capture the attention of his teachers. 
One of those teachers, Charles Eliot, remembered later in life that James had 
been "a very interesting and agreeable pupil," who supplemented his work in 
chemistry with "excursions into other sciences and realms of thought." "He 
liked experimenting," Eliot recalled, "particularly novel experimenting." 
And noting that James "possessed unusual mental powers," he added that 
James later came to be admired as a teacher and scholar for "his penetration, 
his mental alertness, and his free spirit." 22 In fact, Eliot told James himself in 
1894 that, among his many stellar achievements as president of Harvard, 
"your coming to the University and your career as a teacher and writer" had 
offered some of "my most solid grounds of satisfaction." 23 
The main point I wish to make by reviewing this information is simple, 
but too rarely recognized: James made his initial mark and earned his later 
opportunities at Harvard by distinguishing himself in his early scientific 
studies and early teaching in scientific fields. He was not a dilettante who 
spied on science, psychiatry, or psychology from afar, much less from a 
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proverbial armchair. He did his tum in the lab; he visited leading laboratories 
and attended lectures by leading scientists in Europe as well as in the United 
States; he became intimately familiar with the major scientific developments 
of his time; he reviewed significant works in anatomy, physiology, neurolo-
gy, psychiatry, and natural history, including Darwin's work, for major peri-
odicals; he visited asylums and clinics; he was seriously considered for an 
appointment at the new research-oriented Johns Hopkins University as well 
as at Harvard; and due to his unusual linguistic abilities, he enjoyed direct 
access, like few others, to multiple national literatures and to the preeminent 
scientific and clinical research of his time: the French and German, in partic-
ular, as well as the British and just-then-emerging American research. 24 So 
when James aimed his gaze toward psychological phenomena, he was not 
only prepared through reading, thinking, and conversations about philosophi-
cal authors and issues, he was also prepared through his training in science, 
which allowed him to make the best possible sense of these phenomena from 
the perspectives of evolutionary, physiological, neurological, and even phys-
ical science. 25 
3. FROM AUTOMATION TO HABIT 
So what, then, about habit? And how did this topic-and James 's distinctive 
take on it-relate to James's thoughts on "conscious automata"? We have 
seen that James turned to habit in the 1860s in the hope of bringing order and 
direction into his life, as he yearned not only for a sense of purpose but also 
to achieve something as the result of his own self-assertion. (The possibili(l' 
of self-assertion, we saw, became for him a moral as well as scientific issue.) 
We have also noted that James spent the 1860s and '70s developing a first-
hand understanding of major developments in the natural, biological, and 
medical sciences. Habits, he came to know, had been discussed by Darwin 
and others in relation to instinct; and the evolutionary approach-especially 
the question, what are habits good for?-was soon at the forefront of his 
consciousness. But beyond reflecting on this evolutionary question, James 
approached habit from a physiological and, more specifically, from a neuro-
logical perspective. And he subordinated these perspectives, in tum, to the 
emerging view of the universe as a theater of energy and force. Thus, when 
he focused on leading-edge research regarding the activity of the nervous 
system, he tended to conceptualize it in terms of the flow and transformations 
of measurable electrophysiological "currents" and "impulses." 26 
In this context, in 1870, James's former teacher Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Sr. delivered his notable Phi Beta Kappa address on Mechanism in Thought 
and Morals (1871). Although he explicitly stated that he was concerned only 
with "that part of mental and bodily life" that is "independent of our voli-
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tion," thus indicating that (in his view) not all human thought and action was 
purely mechanical, Holmes nevertheless presented a strong case for the oper-
ation of"mechanistic principles" in human experience.27 Just two years later, 
James extended Holmes's proposition, applying mechanistic analysis to all 
of human functioning in his "conscious automaton theory," as he called it 
seventeen years later, using terminology made famous by Thomas Huxley's 
celebrated address of 1874. 28 Interestingly, James admitted in his draft that 
he was offering only "a plausible hypothesis" and was doing so because he 
felt it necessary "to refute the charge that certain characteristics of thought 
cannot possibly depend on mere nerve action." 29 Thus, his proposing of 
conscious automata could be interpreted as simply doing what he would be 
doing throughout the rest of his career: giving the devil his due. But even if 
that was all that he intended, it is still relevant to ask how he justified his later 
rejection of what he had presented in this draft as an intellectually viable 
argument, one that incorporated contemporary notions of"habitual channels" 
for nervous impulses and that reduced "the Will" to a "quantum of force" 
resulting from "oscillations" of "current," which eventually overcomes "the 
mutual interferences and inhibitions of the conflicting waves" set up by these 
oscillations. What we typically regard as a voluntary "decision" at the end of 
this process, James conjectured, is simply a misconstrued sense of effort and 
achievement conveyed by prolonged tension followed by an abrupt resolu-
tion or action. The entire process is "determined mechanically" and "is not in 
essence a whit different from what we have all so often observed in flying a 
kite," during which "the play of the various forces" make the kite dart up and 
down, left and right, before it suddenly "sweeps headlong from the zenith to 
the ground."30 
The soft spot in James's drafted argument, which Jed to his later rejection 
of conscious automaton theory, was his explicitly stated recognition that 
while "in ordinary thinking association by contiguity plays a dominant part," 
things are different in "rapt or passionate thought," in which "association by 
similarity is a marked peculiarity." In this latter case, James noted, "we are 
more intent" and "occult [distant and unexpected] analogies are apt to come 
to light." As a result, we not only "generalize," we also ''make discoveries," 
seeing that "at bottom this ... is really nothing but a case ofthat." 31 
In his draft, James swept the "peculiar" character of thought-by-similarity 
(thinking that is dependent upon the association of ideas, things, and proper-
ties that are similar) into the same explanatory scheme as thought-by-conti-
guity (thinking that is dependent upon ideas, things, and properties that have 
been experienced as proximate to one another in time or space), but the 
distinction between these two traditional ways of understanding human 
thought was the key to his subsequent liberation from-and critique of-a 
strictly mechanical account of human thought and action in lieu of an ac-
count that granted a consequential role to consciousness. The pivotal factors 
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in this liberation were James's adoption of Darwinian selection as a crucial 
function in mental dynamics, combined with his attribution of a directive role 
in selection to interest and attention. Although there seems to have been no 
single moment of inspiration for this constellation of factors, a reconstruction 
of his thinking from available records reveals that a confluence of ideas-
ideas taken from at least three individuals (William Wordsworth, Chauncey 
Wright, and Shadworth Hodgson) in addition to Darwin himself-provided 
the context within which he reached conclusions that remained central to his 
thought-and to his understanding of habit-from that time forward. 32 
The first clear hint of this context was given in March 1873, when James 
reported to his father that he felt much better than he had over the previous 
year (i.e., from around the time he had written his conscious automaton 
draft). The principal factor, he said, was that he had "given up the notion that 
all mental disorder required ... a physical basis" and now "saw that the mind 
did act irrespective of material coercion, and could be dealt with therefore at 
first-hand." 33 This new conviction relieved his fear that he suffered, inesca-
pably, from a physiologically based tendency toward neurasthenia, hypo-
chondria, and melancholia-a fear that was far from assuaged by his articula-
tion of conscious automaton theory. 34 Instrumental in his change of mind 
was not only his continued rumination upon Renouvier's philosophy, but 
also his reading of Wordsworth, on whom he had been "feeding" for "a good 
while." 35 More particularly, he had been reading and reflecting on Words-
worth's long poem "The Excursion," especially its fourth book ("Despon-
dency Corrected"), which trumpets the healing effects associated with belief 
in "the mind's excursive power," which is to say, the mind's ability (figura-
tively speaking) to walk about nature, not passively "chained to its object[s] 
in brute slavery" but rather actively conferring "order and distinctness" upon 
them. In short, Wordsworth's theme was the productive marriage of mind 
and matter, in which mind contributes "interest" as well as "Will" to what 
otherwise would have been but "dull and inanimate" matter. 36 In offering a 
persuasive rendition of this theme, Wordsworth gave James "authentic tid-
ings of invisible things."37 And even before James had worked out the intel-
lectual implications of these tidings, the "persuasion and belief' that Words-
worth helped bring about had "ripened," as Wordsworth himself put it, into a 
"passionate intuition" that would abide from then on at the heart of James's 
psychological and philosophical thought, 38 namely, that each and every mind 
is characterized by the distinctive interests and willfit!ness that it brings to its 
activities. 
James encountered the concept of interest not only in Wordsworth's ide-
alist poetry but also in Chauncey Wright's and Shadworth Hodgson's empiri-
cist psychology and philosophy. Wright had no doubt expressed his views to 
James in personal conversations, but he also gave public voice to them in his 
"Evolution of Self-Consciousness," published just one month after James 
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had spoken with his father about Wordsworth's beneficial impact. The cru-
cial thing about interest, Wright claimed in this article, is that it directs one's 
attention. 39 As a result, as James put it in 1875, "my experience is only what I 
agree to attend to." 40 This individualizing of experience as a function of 
one's own interest and attention became a crucial "law" for James, separating 
his emerging psychology from that of Herbert Spencer and Alexander Bain. 
As he said, "Spencer shrinks from explicit recognition of this law" while 
"Mr. Bain," though "in principle" attuned to it, "does not work it out." 41 
Only Chauncey Wright had done so, James asserted, even though he was 
already aware of Shadworth Hodgson's treatment of interest in Time and 
Space (1865). (In fact, he had begun a close study of this text in September 
1873.) In later years it was Hodgson's, not Wright's, "law of interest" that 
James cited as crucially significant, 42 perhaps because of his greater sympa-
thy with Hodgson's overall philosophy. 
The upshot was that James approached his first substantive publications 
and his first major public addresses (all occurring in 1878) with a firm 
determination to articulate a physiologically based psychology that dis-
avowed conscious automaton theory-and any related mechanistic form of 
associationism-in lieu of attributing active roles in mental dynamics to 
interest and attention, which he came to see as not only compatible with 
Darwinian selectionism, but as illustrative of its reach into the realm of 
consciousness. Among the happy fruits of this conjunction of ideas, for 
James, was the possibility it opened up for the moral life, as advanced and 
structured through the action of consciousness and the development of hab-
its. 43 
The first step in articulating his emerging views, in print, took place in 
James's "Remarks on Spencer's Definition of Mind as Correspondence" 
(1878), in which he criticized Spencer's claim that the mind "adjusts" pas-
sively to its "outer relations" (i.e., its environment). To the contrary, James 
argued, the mind has "preferences and repugnances"-"subjective inter-
ests"-that guide its "selection," from among the dense array of environmen-
tal stimuli, of only those features that matter to it. The mind, in other words, 
has "a vote" in what it takes in; "it is in the game, and not a mere looker-
on."44 
James developed this theme further in his Hopkins Lectures on "The 
Senses and the Brain and Their Relation to Thought" (1878), which gave 
special emphasis to the role of selection in mental functioning. Then, in 
"Brute and Human Intellect" ( 1878), he returned to the issue of association-
by-similarity, which he had treated in his conscious-automaton draft of 1872. 
But now, instead of reducing it to the same mechanistic explanatory scheme 
that seemed to work for association-by-contiguity, he noted that association-
by-similarity depends upon active selection, that is, upon the mind's dissoci-
ating of "interesting" features from the "originally vague syncretism [whole] 
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of consciousness." 45 And in his Lowell Lectures on "The Brain and the 
Mind" ( 1878), he elaborated upon this point, arguing that features, once 
dissociated, are then compared by the mind in light of interests that are 
typically unique to the individual. Thus, the notion of an "impartial con-
sciousness" that accompanies but plays no active role in mental dynamics 
does not fit the apparent facts. Beyond this, James laid out a systematic view 
of the mind as selective at each level of functioning, from bottom to top: i.e., 
from sensation to perception to reasoning to aesthetic activity and finally to 
ethical deliberation and choice. Notably, this systematic approach culminated 
in "the moral life" in which "choice reigns supreme," 46 and it reflected the 
overall Darwinian framework of James's lectures and thought, a selectivist 
framework that James extended, through his knowledge of the nervous sys-
tem as well as his observations of psychological processes, well beyond the 
boundaries set by Darwin himself. 47 
James spelled all of this out, in writing, in his article on "Are We Autom-
ata?" His explicit aim in this article was to show that the apparent functional 
utility of consciousness makes the existence of conscious automata unlikely. 
The crux of his argument revolved around the question, "Of what use to a 
nervous system is a superadded consciousness?" 48 Noting that consciousness 
has evolved across species and over time, he argued on both a priori and a 
posteriori grounds that the utility that prompted this evolution is almost cer-
tainly related to the fact that a selective consciousness, which can compare 
aspects of what is presented to it, can then focus its attention on the one that 
most closely accords with its vital interests. This would, in effect, "load the 
dice" so that the conscious individual could deal with the world in a way that 
is relevant to his concerns rather than suffer, without recourse, the utterly 
random impulses and responses to confront him. 49 As James put it in one of 
his most famous passages, repeated in his Principles of Psychology, "the 
mind is at every stage a theatre of simultaneous possibilities. Consciousness 
consists in the comparison of these with each other, the selection of some, 
and the suppression of the rest by the reinforcing and inhibiting agency of 
attention." 50 
After stating this conclusion, James returned in his article to "the ethical 
field" and discussed "the true moral energy" involved in striving for ends 
that have come to the fore through "selective attention."5 1 Using the example 
of "an inebriate struggling against temptation," he underscored how "the 
selective pressure of consciousness," representing in this case the will to 
avoid alcohol, runs "counter" to "the strongest tendencies of automatic activ-
ity. "52 Thus, he showed how "the moral business" that had concerned him 
from a much earlier age could be preserved and pursued within the domain of 
scientific analysis. And in referring to the "tendencies of automatic activity," 
he introduced the topic (habit) that would become an essential part-both 
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point and counterpoint-of his views on the active, even willful, activity of 
consciousness. 53 
4. HABITAT THE FOUNDATION OF JAMES'S THOUGHT 
Habit, as James had already noted in his Lowell Lectures on "The Brain and 
the Mind," is "the great thing" that allows the cerebral hemispheres to be free 
for "higher flights." 5 ~ Lower levels of neurological functioning, he explained 
to his audience with a series of anatomical slides, are responsible for "fatal," 
that is, automatic or instinctual, responses, but the higher centers are clearly 
essential to intelligent behavior. And more than anything else, he said, habit 
provides "the best explanation" of how "acts of intelligence" come to charac-
terize human behavior. On the one hand, habits represent what an individual 
has learned; on the other, because they occur with a minimum of conscious-
ness and decision-making, habits free up the individual to attend to unex-
pected matters that warrant intelligent response. 55 So, functionally, habits 
bring order to the typical routines of life while allowing consciousness to 
focus on events that fall outside those routines. Thus, they make good sense 
within an evolutionary scheme. 
Though we have only James's notes from his Lowell Lectures, it is clear 
that by October 1878, when the lectures took place, he had developed his 
basic ideas about the relation between brain functioning and mental process-
es, and between deterministic cerebral conditions and sometimes indetermi-
nate cognitive and behavioral responses. And though he would go on to 
become famous for his descriptions of consciousness and his advocacy of the 
will, it becomes clear, as we review the development and structure of his 
thought, that it is habit, not consciousness or will, that holds his system 
together. Habit also provides a crucial means by which he was able to re-
spond positively to the intellectual attraction of causal explanation while also 
accepting that there is a moral imperative-and an actual way-to live a 
responsible and meaningful life, one not absolutely predetermined by causal 
relations. Clearly, then, James's treatment of habit resolved his earlier per-
sonal dilemma and inspired his distinctive way of integrating physiology, 
psychology, philosophy, and ethics. 56 
One of the things that distinguished James's treatment of habit-the cru-
cial element that he added to previous discussions of habit in the works of 
Spencer, Bain, and Carpenter-was his use of what he called "the Meynert 
scheme. "57 As early as his Lowell Lectures, 58 James had recognized that 
Theodor Meynert's neurological analysis of cerebral functioning provided 
the key to explaining "the education of the hemispheres,'· which is to say, the 
process by which human action becomes intelligent. 59 Through a lengthy 
review of neurological evidence, extending well beyond anything undertaken 
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by earlier empirical psychologists, James arrived at a modified version of the 
sensory-motor theory of cortical functioning as proposed by Meynert and 
John Hughlings Jackson. 60 Although James readily admitted "how ignorant 
we really are" regarding "psychogenesis," 61 he nonetheless felt confident, on 
both theoretical and empirical grounds, that something like Meynert's 
scheme, as modified by himself, approximated the neurological basis of habit 
formation. 62 James built up to this conclusion through a series of articles 
published in the 1880s. 63 What he expressed in The Principles of Psycholo-
gy, with this and that additional flourish, was the result of these earlier 
cumulative efforts. 
A fundamental distinction that James made was between instinctual re-
flexes, associated with the lower brain stem, and learned habits, associated 
with the cerebral hemispheres. All of scientific psychology, he felt, was 
developing, in the wake of evolutionary science, on the model of reflex 
action. The pivotal fact was that, in humans, the evolution of the hemispheres 
has allowed not only the emergence of full-blown consciousness but also 
higher orders of habit formation than we see in organisms with less devel-
oped and more rigid nervous systems. The evolutionary advancement repre-
sented by the hemispheres resides in their "plasticity," which facilitates the 
establishment of new or altered neural pathways through which electro-
physiological currents pass on the way from sensory input to motor output. 64 
For James, electrophysiological currents always underlie conscious aware-
ness, emotional feeling, and behavioral action, but the particular pathways by 
which these currents travel from the point of input to the point of output can 
be modified or even created anew. (This is what is made possible by the 
"plastic" nature of the hemispheres.) There is nothing mysterious about this, 
James felt: "The currents, once in [the hemispheres], must find a way out." 65 
If a pathway is blocked, some other "channel" will have to be found. Paths 
taken by electrophysiological currents may be either built-in or accidental. 
but they never come about initially as the result of conscious intent or willful 
effort. 66 Nonetheless, once a pathway has been made, consciousness can 
enter into the picture, ex post facto. This contention was central to James's 
understanding of both habit and will, and it made good on his earlier claim 
that consciousness, as something that has evolved, must have some practical 
utility. 
James's classic illustration of habit formation was a child who has 
touched a lit candle and subsequently remembers the pain (in James 's term, 
the "image") of having done so. He or she will then associate, by means of 
their neural connection, "the original tendency to touch" with the image of 
pain, and this association will inhibit "the touching tendency" the next time 
the child perceives a lit candle. 67 This inhibition of the electrophysiological 
impulse in turn will necessitate the traversing of a new pathway-a different 
route for the current to find its way out of the cerebral hemisphere. With 
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repetition, as the current flows more and more readily down this new route, 
the initially conscious withholding of the hand from the lit candle will be-
come unconscious and habitual. 68 In this way, humans-and to the extent 
that their lesser brain capacity allows, other animals-learn both what not to 
do and what to do when excitation enters the cerebral hemispheres from this 
or that internal or external source. And what can and cannot be done-as 
well as what habits are formed-depends upon the extant evolution of physi-
cal structure and the associated degree of consciousness. The important thing 
is that, whatever happens, whether habitual or non-habitual, there will always 
be a specific neurological substrate, and both consciousness and habits will 
remain firmly rooted in neurology. 
In this scheme-and thus in James's proposed physiological psychology 
as a whole-consciousness itself is now a causal factor. Images, or ideas in 
classical terminology, are posited as factors in the transmission or inhibition 
of neural impulses, acting now to keep the path open to action (when they 
prefigure desirable outcomes), acting at other times to close it (when they 
prefigure undesirable ones). And since "what is early 'learned by heart' 
becomes branded-in (as it were) upon the Cerebrum" so that "it becomes part 
of the normal fabric," 69 it is crucial, James concluded, for each of us "to 
make our nervous system our ally instead of our enemy" by making "auto-
matic and habitual, as early as possible, as many useful actions as we can." 70 
Reflecting the hard-earned lessons of his own life, James added that "there is 
no more miserable human being than one in whom nothing is habitual but 
indecision," 71 and then he proceeded to list a series of maxims that in his 
view would help to assure the establishment of "moral habits." 72 He drew 
these lessons in large part from Bain, but he grounded his support of them on 
his preceding analysis of the plastic nature of neural structures, noting that 
"the physiological study of mental conditions is thus the most powerful ally 
of hortatory ethics." 73 
Although James admitted that many habits in humans as in other animals 
are built upon instinctual tendencies, his primary concern was with those 
habits, especially in humans, that are unique to the individual and instrumen-
tal to living a good life. Striving for the latter, as we have seen, raised for 
James the conundrum of the will. He addressed this conundrum at length in 
his Principles, basing his proposed solution of it-a solution that satisfied 
both his scientific and moral inclinations-upon the same neurological struc-
tures and other factors encountered earlier in his analysis of habit. 74 In partic-
ular, he reached back to a basic premise of his chapter on habit: that a 
potential "innervation" of human conduct is sometimes associated, through 
experience, with an "image" of how we would feel "when the innervation 
[i.e., conduct] is over."75 lfthis "anticipatory image" provides no hindrance, 
the action will take place more or less automatically. But if it arouses resis-
tance, the action will occur only if sufficient will is summoned. Such sum-
192 David E. Leary 
moning occurs typically when the individual has an interest in the imagined 
outcome. That interest directs and sustains the individual's conscious atten-
tion to the outcome, thereby triggering the action whose end has come to 
dominate consciousness. This directing and sustaining of attention to a de-
sired end is, for James, equivalent to a willful assertion that it occur. As he 
put it in his Latinate terminology, it is the fiat (the decision to "let it be") that 
constitutes "the essence of the voluntariness of the act. " 76 Intentionally af-
firming a mental idea or wish of this kind, James noted, "is the only psychic 
state which introspection lets us discern as the forerunner of our voluntary 
acts." 77 
The key hypothesis underlying this account of willful action-action 
caused by conscious and even effortful attention to the idea of its conse-
quences-is provided by James's "ideo-motor theory," which he elaborated 
upon Maudsley's more restricted clinical observations of "ideo-motor ac-
tion."78 According to Maudsley's observations, the idea of an action, barring 
effective resistance, brings about that action. James may have been attracted 
to this premise, initially, because it represents consciousness-and more spe-
cifically, particular conscious ideas-as effectual, but he was probably per-
suaded that the premise is true by his reading about and experimental dupli-
cation of various phenomena associated with hypnotic states, in which an 
idea (i.e., a "suggestion") is implemented without hesitation, unless some 
inhibitory obstruction takes place. 79 
However ironic it may seem, habit is important in James's treatment of 
will. Once established, James argued, a habit can be triggered by "the idea of 
the end," which "tends more and more to make itself all-sufficient." So if the 
initiating idea is held long enough in consciousness, James continued, "the 
whole chain [of associated connections and final action] rattles off quasi-
reflexly," as described in his earlier chapter on habit. 80 Although in some 
cases "the bare idea of a movement's sensible effects" is a sufficient "mental 
cue" to action, in other cases "an additional mental antecedent, in the shape 
of a fiat, decision, consent, volitional mandate, or other synonymous phe-
nomenon of consciousness" must intervene "before the movement can fol-
low. "81 But when it follows, it tends to trace the path that has been estab-
lished in the past, both by its electrophysiological current and by the behav-
ioral outcome to which it has led. Though James gave only a single example 
of his own before referring the reader to relevant examples provided by Bain, 
he insisted that "it was in fact through meditating on the phenomenon in my 
own person that I first became convinced of the truth of the doctrine which 
these pages present."82 We have seen earlier some of the personal experi-
ences that fed his meditations. In fact, it is noteworthy that his explanation of 
the will in 1890, wedded now to speculative yet experimentally grounded 
neurology and to the clinical observations of a leading psychiatrist, is amaz-
ingly consonant with Renouvier's definition of free will as "the sustaining of 
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a thought because I choose to," which James had accepted as he struggled 
with the implications of scientific analysis and skepticism, way back in 
1870. 83 
In the next pages in his chapter on the will, James went from a discussion 
of simple yes-no decision-making to more complex situations in which ac-
tions result from "deliberation" over multiple, often conflicting ideas about 
possible actions. He also discussed five types of decision, the feeling of 
effort, and two kinds of "unhealthy will": the "obstructed will" that makes 
normal actions impossible and "the explosive will" that makes abnormal 
ones irrepressible. These are interesting and relevant discussions, as are his 
subsequent critique of pleasure and pain as "springs of action" and his philo-
sophical ruminations on "free-will" and "the education of the will," which 
include further neurological speculations. But we have covered enough to 
document our central contention that habit is at the foundation of James's 
thought, providing a means for the emergence of distinctly human, purpose-
ful behavior while also playing an essential role in other aspects of psycho-
logical functioning, including the will. All that remains to underscore is 
James's contention that neither habit nor will creates options out of thin air; 
they can only tip the balance to or from one or the other extant idea by 
selecting or not selecting it for attention from among "the theatre of simulta-
neous possibilities" for human action. 8~ But though the range of potential 
habits is constrained and the will is not radically free, both being dependent 
on material conditions and their conscious representation, they are nonethe-
less indelibly individual and consequential. Each person, as James had hoped 
to show, is in the game, each can make a difference, and each can leave a 
nick in the universe by the cultivation of his or her own habits and the 
assertion of his or her own will. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In subsequent works after the publication of The Principles of Psychology in 
1890, James continued to direct attention to the importance of habit, most 
notably in his popular textbook on psychology (Psychology: Briefer Course 
[1892], an abbreviated version of his Principles) and in his Talks to Teachers 
(delivered throughout the 1890s and then published in 1899). In the former 
work, besides treating habit itself in a thorough manner, he emphasized that 
"what is called our 'experience' is almost entirely determined by our habits 
of attention,"85 and he discussed a number of ways in which "the law of 
neural habit" has an impact on human thought, feeling, and behavior. 86 In the 
latter work, he hit many of the same notes, after defining education as "the 
organization of acquired habits of conduct and tendencies to behavior" 87 and 
before concluding with a Spinozistic plea that ''you [should] make freemen 
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of your pupils by habituating them to act, whenever possible, under the 
notion of a good," which is to say, according to the idea of what, first, 
teachers and later the students themselves take to be good. 88 To the consider-
able extent that humans are "bundles of habit," 89 he argued, their moral 
character will consist in "an organized set of habits ofreaction. " 90 
At the same time, over the final decades of his life, a counterpoint to the 
positive representation of habit became increasingly apparent in James' s 
thought and work. This counterpoint had always been a feature, though a 
much less prominent feature, of his work. For instance, in his very first 
publication on philosophy, James contrasted philosophical thinking with 
common ways of thinking, saying that the philosophical student had to get 
into the habit of thinking unhabitually! As he put it, "philosophic study 
means the habit of always seeing an alternative, of not taking the usual for 
granted, of making conventionalities fluid again, of imagining foreign states 
of mind. In a word, it means the possession of mental perspective," 91 by 
which he clearly meant the possession of a different perspective from that of 
common sense. This accorded with his understanding of "genius," which he 
defined early on as the ability to make atypical analogical connections. 92 He 
repeated this definition in Principles93 and expressed it two years later when 
he wrote that "genius, in truth, means little more than the faculty of perceiv-
ing in an unhabitual way." 94 In contrast, said James, most of us "have no 
eyes but for those aspects of things" which we have "already been taught to 
discem"-things that "have been labeled for us," the labels then being 
"stamped into our mind." 95 Thus, "most of us grow more and more enslaved 
to the stock conceptions with which we have once become familiar," leading 
to a kind of "old-fogyism" in which our thinking and behavior are all too 
conventional. 96 So, while it may simplify and organize life to have routine 
ways of perceiving, thinking about, and responding to the stream of experi-
ence, James realized that there is a potential downside to this economy of 
habit. Hence, he felt that some individuals, at least, need to see and think and 
act outside the box, for the sake of others as well as themselves, lest habit 
become too much of a good thing, stultifying and routinizing rather than 
freeing and guiding us. 
Perhaps it was James's increasing dismay at the political and social con-
ventions of the 1890s and early 1900s that aroused him, as it seems, to seek 
more pointedly new ways of thinking and acting after 1890. 97 But in any 
case, in his initial discussion of pragmatism, he represented the pragmatic 
philosopher as a "path-finder," even a "trail blazer," who sets out to identify 
new ways of trying to get to the "center" of the forest of experience. 98 It is 
probably relevant too that, after focusing on establishing psychology on a 
scientific basis over the preceding decades, James was now concerned, in his 
initial presentation on pragmatism, with making room for religious as well as 
scientific modes of understanding and living. Only a few years later, in 
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Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), he discussed "the hot spot in a 
man's consciousness" that constitutes "the habitual centre of his personal 
energy" 99 and explored how this habitual center of energy might be "con-
verted" to another set of ideas (e.g., religious ideas) by that individual's 
"growth into new habits." 100 
Similarly, James expressed an increasing desire to break other kinds of 
barriers to innovation and revivification, such as restraints placed on the 
inner "energies" and "powers" of human beings. 101 Liberating and express-
ing those powers, he hoped, would free himself and others from being "vic-
tims of habit-neurosis" and from "habituation" to "literality and decorum." 102 
In sum, then, James seemed to be saying, in a variety of venues, that if habit 
can help us feel comfortable in a world of change, there are times when 
breaking habits, challenging beliefs, trying out new perspectives-and feel-
ing uncomfortable-is more likely to prompt major advancements in knowl-
edge, custom, and goodwill. 
Perhaps James's pragmatism can best be seen, in this context, as a way of 
moving from resting point to resting point along the path to fuller knowledge, 
more confident beliefs, and a better world. "A pragmatist turns his back 
resolutely and once for all upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to professional 
philosophers," said James. 103 "Pragmatism unstiffens all our theories" while 
allowing enough lingering, if loosely held, "loyalty" to "older truths" to keep 
us sufficiently steady for the next step into a newer and better world. 104 As 
"mediator and reconciler," pragmatism has "no prejudices whatever, no ob-
structive dogmas, no rigid canons .... Her only test of probable truth is what 
works best in the way of leading us" ahead, toward the goal of ever more 
useful thought and ever more satisfying life. 105 Perhaps it is useful to think of 
James urging us to develop a new habit of proceeding pragmatically, keeping 
one hand on the relatively known past as we reach for the relatively unknown 
future, striving for what is beyond our grasp but not beyond our hope. 
Whether that is a useful thought or not-whether James's pragmatism 
represents a blending of the habitual and unhabitual in a productive alli-
ance-is an issue for another time. This chapter has been concerned primari-
ly with exploring the role of habit in William James's life and thought, and 
how it allowed him to mediate between his physiological studies, psycholog-
ical speculations, philosophical conclusions, and moral aspirations. Though 
typically passed over as one of his more popular and least original contribu-
tions to psychology and philosophy, in fact his treatment of habit was crucial 
in allowing him to walk a fine line between scientific analysis (and objective 
determinism), on the one hand, and moral advocacy (and subjective indeter-
minism), on the other. It also allowed for the imposition of order upon 
relatively unstructured human experience (as readily illustrated in his own 
personal life), while providing a place, even if an admittedly small place, in 
Which human will (considered in a new way) could be seen as playing a 
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crucial role in the midst of an apparently all-too-material universe. And 
although James spent the rest of his career, after 1890, searching for a com-
pelling articulation of a new metaphysics that would eliminate the chasm 
between mental and bodily processes-maybe it would be a new kind of 
materialism that was somehow aufgehoben to incorporate consciousness as a 
natural, evolved, and efficacious part of nature 106-in the meantime his ap-
proach to habit and to the closely associated processes of cognition, feeling, 
volition, and action would have to "stand in," however awkwardly at times, 
for this needed, eagerly anticipated, but indefinitely deferred conceptual and 
theoretical breakthrough. 
James was not alone-and was far from the first-to show such interest 
in or to make extensive use of habit. He was well aware of earlier treatments 
by Aristotle, Augustine, the Scholastics, Jonathan Edwards, and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, and he was intimately familiar with the relevant philo-
sophical ideas of Alexander Bain and Herbert Spencer, the physiological 
speculations of Thomas Laycock and William Carpenter, the psychiatric ob-
servations of Isaac Ray and Henry Maudsley, and the innovative thought of 
his own friends Chauncey Wright and Charles Sanders Peirce. He was also 
well informed about the recent results of experimental physiology and 
neurology in England, France, Germany, and elsewhere, including the re-
search of David Ferrier, John Hughlings Jackson, and Theodor Meynert. His 
travels, studies, and reading-as random as they may have seemed to oth-
ers-provided an unusually broad and solid framework for his creative think-
ing. It is probably safe to say that few twenty-first-century psychologists or 
philosophers, aside from a rather small group of dedicated James scholars, 
realize how deep as well as wide his reading, conversations, correspondence, 
and reflections were in the decades leading up to the publication of his 
Principles of Psychology, which in various ways provided the foundation for 
his subsequent work in philosophy as well as psychology. Everyone knows 
that Principles, his first book, was published relatively late in his career (he 
was forty-eight when it appeared), but a careful review of the preceding 
development of his thought has revealed how early he came to his basic ideas 
and how thoroughly he worked through their implications over the subse-
quent decades. In addition, tracing the development of James's thinking has 
highlighted his intentions, the obstacles he met, and how he dealt with them. 
Seemingly simple ideas-even ones that he took directly from someone 
else-were often made to do distinctive work within the economy of his own 
evolving system of thought. This fact has often been missed by those who 
analyze elements of his thinking without sufficient understanding of their 
role within the entire corpus of his thought. 
Hilary Putnam has remarked that "William James is a figure who simply 
won't go away."107 One reason, as the neuropsychologist Richard F. Thomp-
son has noted, is that "his views remain astonishingly contemporary." 108 
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Regarding habit, for instance, James's emphasis on plasticity "has only re-
cently regained popularity in study of the neurobiology ofleaming and mem-
ory," and his neurological speculations are now seen as advocating a "kind of 
connectionist machinery," akin to contemporary theorizing. Indeed, so much 
is now going the way of James's hypotheses-for instance, regarding the 
localization of functions and the basic structure of the brain as "a circuit, 
albeit an immensely complicated one"-that Thompson is confident that 
"James would be very pleased" by the recent body of neurological literature. 
Similar things have been said, from time to time, about James's ideas in other 
areas of psychology and in philosophy as well. Bruce Wilshire is only one 
among many who have called for "a serious reconsideration of William 
James," despite the "mixed bag" of "strengths" and "defects" that he sees in 
James's work. 109 Even regarding the controversial topic of free will, anathe-
ma in scientific psychology and much of philosophy over the past century, 
James's ideas and near analogues are once again receiving close, sympathet-
ic, even appreciative attention. 110 
Further consideration of James's views, then, can advance not only our 
knowledge of history but also our understanding of where matters currently 
stand and where they might be heading in the future. With regard to the topic 
of habit, in particular, this chapter has clarified and expanded upon some of 
the basic claims that James made: claims that have sometimes been sim-
plified by others to the point of travesty. As Charlene Haddock Seigfried has 
said, rephrasing what John McDermott said before her, "James is delightfully 
easy reading the first time around, but gets more difficult with each succes-
sive reading." 111 Unfortunately, few people bother to read James a second 
time, if they read him at all, and the vast majority of those who read him at 
alt, read only selected portions of well-known classics, whether The Princi-
ples of Psychology, The Will to Believe, The Varieties of Religious Experi-
ence, Pragmatism, A Pluralistic Universe, The Meaning of Truth, or Essays 
in Radical Empiricism. Far fewer know about, much less read, the documents 
and other works (letters, diaries, notebooks, unpublished drafts, and early 
articles) that have made possible this reconstruction of his views on habit and 
associated matters and their relation to his views on science and morality as 
welt as psychology and philosophy. With their aid we have seen how James 
used habit to mediate between scientific determinism and moral freedom, 
and thus to establish psychology and philosophy on a new foundation. 
The philosopher Stephen Toulmin ( 1922-2009), a beloved teacher and dear 
friend to whose memory I dedicate this chapter, once observed that "philoso-
phy has always flourished on half-fledged sciences." 112 The still-fertile phil-
osophical contributions of William James, emerging as they did from the 
half-tilted soil of new scientific research in anatomy, neurology, and psychol-
ogy, provide as compelling an illustration as one could wish. 
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